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Abstract  Software agents’ ability to interact within different open systems, designed by different groups, presupposes an agreement
on an unambiguous definition of a set of concepts, used to describe the context of the interaction and the communication language
the agents can use. Agents’ interactions ought to allow for reliable expectations on the possible evolution of the system;
however, in open systems interacting agents may not conform to predefined specifications. A possible solution is to define
interaction environments including a normative component, with suitable rules to regulate the behaviour of agents. To tackle
this problem we propose an application-independent metamodel of artificial institutions that can be used to define open multiagent
systems. In our view an artificial institution is made up by an ontology that models the social context of the interaction,
a set of authorizations to act on the institutional context, a set of linguistic conventions for the performance of institutional
actions and a system of norms that are necessary to constrain the agents’ actions.

Abstract  In this paper we address the problem of defining social roles in multi-agent systems. Social roles provide the basic structure
of social institutions and organizations. We start from the properties attributed to roles both in the multi-agent systems
and the Object Oriented community, and we use them in an ontological analysis of the notion of social role. We identify three
main properties of social roles. First, they are definitionally dependent on the institution they belong to, i.e. the definition
of a role is given inside the definition of the institution. Second, they attribute powers to the agents playing them, like
creating commitments for the institutions and the other roles. Third, they allow roles to play roles, in the same way as agents
do. Using Input/Output logics, we propose a formalization of roles in multi-agent systems satisfying the three properties
we identified.

Abstract  While the sociality of software agents drives toward the definition of institutions for multi agent systems, their autonomy
requires that such institutions are ruled by appropriate norm mechanisms. Computational institutions represent useful abstractions.
In this paper we show how computational institutions can be built on top of the RoleX infrastructure, a role-based system
with interesting features for our aim. We achieve a twofold goal: on the one hand, we give concreteness to the institution
abstractions; on the other hand, we demonstrate the flexibility of the RoleX infrastructure.

Abstract  In order to design and implement electronic institutions that incorporate norms governing the behavior of the participants
of those institutions, some crucial steps should be taken. The first problem is that human norms are (on purpose) specified
on an abstract level. This ensures applicability of the norms over long periods of time in many different circumstances. However,
for an electronic institution to function according to those norms, they should be concrete enough to be able to check them
run time. A second problem is that norms describe which behavior is desirable and permitted, but not how this is achieved
in an institution. In the “real world” regulations often indicate procedures for implementing and enforcing the law. Likewise
we should devise means to annotate the norms with practical aspects such as enforcement mechanisms, sanctions, etc. in order
to get requirements for an institution that will enforce norms (by either constraining behavior within the norms or reacting
to violation of the norms). The choice of which kind of mechanism is chosen is not a normative one, but usually based on criteria
of efficiency and/or feasibility of the mechanism. In this paper we present our view on how to approach these problems and
other related issues to be solved in order to develop e-institutions capable to operate in complex, highly regulated scenarios.