Abstract This study focused on whether and how deliberations affected the comprehension of capital penalty phase jury instructions
and patterns of racially discriminatory death sentencing. Jury-eligible subjects were randomly assigned to view one of four
versions of a simulated capital penalty trial in which the race of defendant (Black or White) and the race of victim (Black
or White) were varied orthogonally. The participants provided their initial “straw” sentencing verdicts individually and then
deliberated in simulated 4–7 person “juries.” Results indicated that deliberation created a punitive rather than lenient shift
in the jurors’ death sentencing behavior, failed to improve characteristically poor instructional comprehension, did not reduce
the tendency for jurors to misuse penalty phase evidence (especially, mitigation), and exacerbated the tendency among White
mock jurors to sentence Black defendants to death more often than White defendants.
Content Type Journal Article
Category Original Article
DOI 10.1007/s10979-008-9168-2
Authors
Mona Lynch, University of California, Irvine Irvine CA USA
Craig Haney, University of California, Santa Cruz Santa Cruz CA USA
Abstract What factors shape environmental policies across Europe? In order to answer this question most economists would probably adopt
a Public Choice approach. This approach has convincingly explained some aspects of environmental policies that exist in a
similar fashion across Europe. But why do many environmental policies differ across European countries? This article argues
that in order to understand differences in environmental policies in Europe North’s analysis of institutional change focusing
on formal and informal institutions, incomplete information and path dependence is useful. North’s approach is applied to
explain differences in a particular field of European environmental policy: The implementation of the EU’s Eco-Management
and Audit Scheme (EMAS) in Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. The starting point of the analysis is the observation that
participation of companies in EMAS markedly differs between countries. It is shown that these differences can be explained
with differences in formal and informal institutions in the three Member States, incomplete information of relevant actors,
and path dependence.
Content Type Journal Article
DOI 10.1007/s10657-009-9099-5
Authors
Frank Wätzold, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research UFZ Permoser Straße 15 04318 Leipzig Germany
Abstract Scholars of law and economics have produced a huge amount of literature on how to design an optimal legal standard in tort
law to regulate international torts. However, there are few works to use these theories in the analysis of tort law in an
individual jurisdiction. In this paper, I apply a law-and-economics analytical framework to the study of the legal standards
for deceit in English tort law with an aim to show that the law-and-economics approach could generate new insights valuable
to broad our understanding of the law of deceit.
Content Type Journal Article
DOI 10.1007/s10657-009-9100-3
Authors
Qi Zhou, The University of Sheffield School of Law Bartolome House, Winter Street Sheffield S3 7DN UK
Abstract Various arguments have been provided for drawing non-humans such as animals and artificial agents into the sphere of moral
consideration. In this paper, I argue for a shift from an ontological to a social-philosophical approach: instead of asking
what an entity is, we should try to conceptually grasp the quasi-social dimension of relations between non-humans and humans.
This allows me to reconsider the problem of justice, in particular distributive justice. Engaging with the work of Rawls, I show that an expansion of the contractarian framework to non-humans causes an important
problem for liberalism, but can be justified by a contractarian argument. Responding to Bell’s and Nussbaum’s comments on
Rawls, I argue that we can justify drawing non-humans into the sphere of distributive justice by relying on the notion of
a co-operative scheme. I discuss what co-operation between humans and non-humans can mean and the extent to which it depends
on properties. I conclude that we need to imagine principles of ecological and technological distributive justice.
Content Type Journal Article
DOI 10.1007/s11158-009-9080-8
Authors
Mark Coeckelbergh, University of Twente Department of Philosophy P. O. Box 217 7500 AE Enschede The Netherlands
Are Breast Implants Better than Female Genital Mutilation?
Content Type Journal Article
DOI 10.1007/s11158-009-9081-7
Authors
Rebecca Reilly-Cooper, University of Manchester Manchester Centre for Political Theory, Politics, School of Social Sciences Arthur Lewis Building, Oxford Rd. Manchester M13 9PL UK
Abstract The purpose of this essay is, first, to suggest Ragnar Nurkse as a Law & Economics thinker, and second, yet more importantly,
to demonstrate the possibility and desirability of a Law & Economics of Development along Nurksean lines. Ragnar Nurkse (1907–1959),
whose 100th birthday is celebrated in 2007, is one of the founding fathers of classic development economics. Given the recent
interest in the Law & Economics of development, showing how a classic figure in the field successfully used such an approach
might be of considerable interest, especially as development economics is a very emotional field which may well profit from
the ‘objectivizing’ function of Law & Economics. Nurkse’s economics-based realism, his focus on what effect a program really
has, rather than what it is supposed to have, and on what a policy can steer or change and what not, based on a typically
Stiglerian attention to aggregate welfare, seem especially productive. Finally, the essay suggests a set of Nurkse-based principles
or theses for a Law & Economics of Development.
Content Type Journal Article
DOI 10.1007/s10657-009-9097-7
Authors
Wolfgang Drechsler, Tallinn University of Technology Sütiste tee 21 13419 Tallinn Estonia
Abstract The greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme in the European Union primarily uses grandfathering until 2012, which means that
polluters get emission rights free of charge based on their historical emissions. Energy consumers accuse energy producers
of making windfall profits by incorporating the market value of those free rights into the energy prices. However, we develop
a numerical example to illustrate that the reasoning of the producers is correct. We also explain why this market value is
only partly passed on to consumers. We consider various measures and conclude that only auctioning the rights after 2012 nullifies
the additional profits.
Content Type Journal Article
DOI 10.1007/s10657-009-9098-6
Authors
E. Woerdman, University of Groningen Faculty of Law, Department of Law and Economics P.O. Box 716 9700 AS Groningen The Netherlands
O. Couwenberg, University of Groningen Faculty of Law, Department of Law and Economics P.O. Box 716 9700 AS Groningen The Netherlands
A. Nentjes, University of Groningen Faculty of Law, Department of Law and Economics P.O. Box 716 9700 AS Groningen The Netherlands
Abstract This article focuses on drug trafficking violence in Mexico and on those elements of the violence in Iraq which are related
to competition for the control over smuggling of oil and other largely licit commodities. It suggests that [...]
