Law JournalFeeds

Abstract  The aim of this paper is to investigate which factors influence the pattern of enforcement (violation) of basic rights among
women trafficked for sexual exploitation. A conceptual framework is adopted where the degree of agency and the possibility
to influence the terms of sex-based transactions are seen as conditional on the enforcement of some basic rights. Using data
collected by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) on women assisted by the organization after having been trafficked
for sexual exploitation, we investigate the enforcement (violation) of five uncompromisable rights, namely the right to physical
integrity, to move freely, to have access to medical care, to use condoms, and to exercise choice over sexual services. By
combining classification tree analysis and ordered probit estimation we find that working location and country of work are
the main determinants of rights enforcement, while individual and family characteristics play a marginal role. Specifically,
we find that (1) in lower market segments working on the street is comparatively less ‘at risk’ of rights violation; (2) there
is no consistently ‘good’ or ‘bad’ country of work, but public awareness on trafficking within the country is important; (3)
the strength of organised crime in the country of work matters only in conjunction with other local factors, and (4) being
trafficked within one’s country, as opposed to being trafficked internationally, is associated with higher risk of rights
violation.

Abstract  The paper draws on recent research on the economics of prostitution focussing on the role of stigma in shaping the interaction
between demand and supply and the resulting sub-markets in which this activity is typically organised. Here we extend the
framework to consider the role of reputation and stigma in determining policy decisions regarding the regulation of prostitution
and show how sub-optimal outcomes (from the point of view of the welfare of sex workers) may prevail.

Abstract  A cross-section analysis covering up to 42 countries and including the usual control variables shows that central government
outlays as a share of general government outlays are significantly larger if the judges of the constitutional or supreme court
are independent of the federal government and parliament and if the barriers to constitutional amendment are high. This evidence
is consistent with the view that constitutional judges have a vested interest in centralization or that there is self-selection
or both. These insights are used to draw lessons for the reform of the European Court of Justice. Self-selection should be
reduced by requiring judicial experience—ideally with the highest national courts. The vested interest in centralization could
be overcome by adding a subsidiarity court.

Abstract  The duty-of-care requirement cannot be used anymore as the touchstone to differentiate negligence from strict liability because
it can be found in many forms of the latter. Duty of care is smuggled into strict liability hidden under the scope of liability
requirement (traditionally called “proximate causation”). As far as the scope of liability requirement is common to negligence
and to many forms of strict liability, there is a fairly large common ground to both liability rules, and consequently the
marginal Hand formula is applied to both rules. Indeed, under a negligence rule, the marginal Hand formula is applied twice:
first to assess whether or not the defendant did breach his or her duty of care, and, second, to delimit whether or not the
defendant’s behavior was a proximate cause of the harm suffered by the victim. However, under a strict liability rule, the
Hand formula is applied only once when the proximate causation question is raised. Traditional law and economics analysis
has almost always taken the normative question raised by the causation requirement as given, which is a potential major problem
due to the importance of scope of liability or proximate causation in legal practice. Defining the scope of liability, that
is to say, the boundaries of the pool of potential defendants, is the basic legal policy decision for each and every liability
rule. In the normative model presented in this paper, the government first chooses efficient scope of liability, and given
the scope of liability, the government then decides the liability rule and damages that guarantee efficient precaution. In
the article, most known scope of liability rationales developed by both common law and civil law systems are discussed in
order to show the substantial common ground between negligence and strict liability.