Abstract Contract enforcement is acknowledged as a major issue in Law and in Economics. Contrasting substitution and complementary
perspectives with respect to the role of private vs. public enforcement institutions, this article analyses how contract law
can support private institutions, and enhance economic efficiency. With multilateral agreements at stake, self-regulation
and reputation mechanisms at the core of private ordering have limitations that collective organizations backed by the Law
help to overcome. The analysis is substantiated by empirical data from the cattle industry. Our results suggest the need for
a broader approach to contract regulation by legal scholars and antitrust-authorities.
perspectives with respect to the role of private vs. public enforcement institutions, this article analyses how contract law
can support private institutions, and enhance economic efficiency. With multilateral agreements at stake, self-regulation
and reputation mechanisms at the core of private ordering have limitations that collective organizations backed by the Law
help to overcome. The analysis is substantiated by empirical data from the cattle industry. Our results suggest the need for
a broader approach to contract regulation by legal scholars and antitrust-authorities.
- Content Type Journal Article
- DOI 10.1007/s10657-009-9114-x
- Authors
- Armelle Mazé, INRA SAD-APT 16 rue Claude Bernard 75231 Paris Cedex 05 France
- Claude Ménard, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne – Université de Paris (Panthéon-Sorbonne) 106 Boulevard de l’Hôpital 75647 Paris Cedex 13 France
- Journal European Journal of Law and Economics
- Online ISSN 1572-9990
- Print ISSN 0929-1261
- Journal Volume Volume 29
- Journal Issue Volume 29, Number 1 / February, [...]
