In her provocative recent book, Split Decisions, Janet Halley argues that
left political movements have suffered from a “convergentist” assumption: They assume that forms of critique or intervention that serve the interest of one group, for example, feminists, also serve the interest of other groups, for example, gay/lesbian or queer activists. She contends that we ought to set aside this kind of convergentist assumption in order to examine the ways in which our frames, premises, and strategies may in fact point us in different directions. In this Article, I pose a contrary hypothesis: Analysis of and organizing around gender and sexuality may be suffering not from too much convergence but from too little. [...]
For a very long time, issues of sexuality and gender remained outside the boundaries of what was considered important legal scholarship. Indeed, the very presence in the legal academy of the concepts of sexuality and gender was viewed as barely legitimate, certainly not respectable, and, in intellectual terms, at best facetious—or, to let Justice White rest in peace, at best frivolous. [...]
The Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 95-136, February 2010.
Abstract We investigate the evolution of the legal institution of citizenship from a political economy perspective. We first present a median‐voter model of the determination of citizenship laws. Next we test the implications of the model on a new set of data on citizenship laws across countries. We show that citizenship laws respond to economic and institutional determinants endogenously. When facing increasing immigration, countries with a jus soli regime tend to restrict their legislation, whereas countries with a jus sanguinis regime resist innovation. The welfare burden does not prove to be an obstacle to jus soli legislation, but demographic stagnation encourages it. A high degree of democracy promotes the adoption of jus soli elements, whereas instability of state borders determined by decolonization impedes it. Religion and ethnic diversity have no residual effect. [...]
The Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 137-165, February 2010.
Abstract We develop a legal contract enforcement theory of the decision to own or lease. The allocation of ownership rights will minimize enforcement costs when the legal system is inefficient. In particular, when legal enforcement of contracts is costly, there will be a shift from arrangements that rely on such enforcement (such as a rental agreement) toward other forms that do not (such as direct ownership). We then test this prediction and show that costly enforcement of rental contracts hampers the development of the rental housing market in a cross section of countries. We argue that this association is not the result of reverse causation from a developed rental market to more investor protective enforcement and is not driven by alternative institutional channels. The results provide supportive evidence for the importance of legal contract enforcement for market development and the optimal allocation of property rights. [...]
The Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 185-221, February 2010.
Abstract Children born to unmarried parents may receive lower human capital investments, leading to higher levels of criminal activity as adults. Therefore, unmarried fertility may be positively associated with future crime. Alternatively, in an environment in which social stigma attached to nonmarital fertility is high, many low‐match‐quality parents will marry, and children reared in these families may actually be worse off than if their parents had not married. We explore these effects empirically, finding that over the long run unmarried fertility is positively associated with murder and property crime but that the degree of social stigma has affected this relationship. For instance, our results suggest that some marriages in the 1940s and 1950s were of such low quality that the children involved would have been better off in single‐parent households; however, this finding is reversed for marriages in the 1960s and thereafter—many marriages that would have benefited children were forgone. [...]
The Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 1-27, February 2010.
Abstract Governments employ two basic policies for acquiring land: taking it through the exercise of their power of eminent domain, and purchasing it. The social desirability of these policies is compared in a model in which the government’s information about landowners’ valuations is imperfect. Under this assumption, the policy of purchase possesses the market test advantage that the government obtains land from an owner only if its offer exceeds the owner’s valuation. However, the policy suffers from a drawback when the land that the government needs is owned by many parties. In that case, the government’s acquisition will fail if any of the owners refuses to sell. Hence, eminent domain becomes appealing if the number of landowners is large. This conclusion holds regardless of whether the land that the government seeks is a parcel at a fixed location or instead is a contiguous parcel that may be located anywhere in a region. [...]
The Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 29-64, February 2010.
Abstract Many police agencies have enacted measures designed to reduce racial profiling, yet little empirical evidence exists regarding the effects of such programs. This article uses the occurrence of a racial profiling scandal in New Jersey to quantify the effect of a move toward race‐neutral policing. The scandal and subsequent reforms led to an estimated 16–33 percent decrease in annual arrests of minorities for motor vehicle theft. I also present evidence that, as policing against minorities decreased, motor vehicle theft increased in areas populated by minorities. My implied elasticities do not suggest that minorities respond to policing intensity differently than the general population. New Jersey data generate little strong evidence of additional adverse responses by minorities to lessened police scrutiny. The findings are robust to a number of specification checks, and similar patterns are observable in Maryland, a state that experienced a profiling scandal several years before New Jersey. [...]
The Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 223-237, February 2010.
Abstract On the basis of evidence of price‐fixing, in May 2006 the Canadian Competition Bureau targeted retail gasoline outlets in some local markets in the province of Quebec. In June 2008, criminal charges were filed against many individuals and companies operating in those local markets. We employ a differences‐in‐differences approach to determine whether the public announcement of the antitrust investigation triggered a reaction in one of the targeted markets. We find that the price of gasoline in the targeted market fell by 1.75 cents per liter after the public announcement of the investigation. We also briefly discuss how well the Stiglerian theory of collusion performs in this real‐world conspiracy. [...]
The Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 65-93, February 2010.
Abstract Using panel data for 111 countries over the period 1982–2002, we employ two indexes that cover a wide range of human rights to empirically analyze whether and to what extent terrorism affects human rights. According to our results, terrorism significantly, but not dramatically, diminishes governments’ respect for basic human rights such as the absence of extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture. The result is robust to how we measure terrorist attacks, to the method of estimation, and to the choice of countries in our sample. However, we find no effect of terrorism on empowerment rights. [...]
