The Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 167-183, February 2010.
Abstract Production requiring licensing groups of complementary patents implements a coordination game among patent holders, who can price patents by choosing among combinations of fixed and royalty fees. Summed across patents, these fees become the total producer cost of the package of patents. Royalties, because they function as excise taxes, add to marginal costs, resulting in higher prices and reduced quantities of the downstream product and lower payoffs to the patent holders. Using fixed fees eliminates this inefficiency but yields a more complex coordination game in which there are multiple equilibria, which are very fragile in that small mistakes can lead the downstream firm to not license the technology, resulting in inefficient outcomes. We report on a laboratory market investigation of the efficiency effects of coordinated pricing of patents in a patent pool. We find that pool‐like pricing agreements can yield fewer coordination failures in the pricing of complementary patents. [...]
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To be or not to be: Charles Beitz on the Philosophy of Human Rights Journal Res PublicaOnline ISSN [...] Abstract Academic debate on public utility regulation has considerably evolved over the past 50 years. The conflict between the supporters Both South Korea ( Korea ) and the European Union have witnessed struggles regarding the rights of the accused. [...]
Introduction Notwithstanding moral obligations, the inability to prosecute crimes negatively affects a state's international reputation. For over forty years, overseas [...] |
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