|
|
Publication year: 2010
Source: International Review of Law and Economics, Volume 30, Issue 3, September 2010, Page CO2
[No author name available] [...]
Publication year: 2010
Source: International Review of Law and Economics, In Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available online 31 August 2010
Volker, Arnold , Marion, Hübner
We examine the question of whether a combination of law enforcement and redistributive transfers will be used in fighting criminality due to poverty. This is done in a model where a proportion of the poor participates in illegal activities. The victims of theft are firms. In contrast to most of the literature, we add a dynamic aspect: Technological progress leads to a permanent increase in labor productivities and firm output. We show that transfers will be used to fight criminality only after a certain level of economic development has been [...]
Publication year: 2010
Source: International Review of Law and Economics, In Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available online 20 August 2010
Morten, Hviid , Andrei, Medvedev
The incidence of private actions for damages in antitrust cases has varied markedly across jurisdictions. The procedural rules surrounding private litigation may account for some of these differences. This paper explores the effect of rules concerning contribution among multiple defendants who are jointly and severally liable for a cartel infringement. The no-contribution rule is shown to lead to higher levels of aggregate damages and more information revelation to the private plaintiff. However the no-contribution rule also has the potential to neutralise any public leniency programme, thereby possibly reducing the number of cartels [...]
Publication year: 2010
Source: International Review of Law and Economics, In Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available online 20 August 2010
Sandra, Rousseau
Classical theory states that the optimal fine equals the damage caused by the crime divided by the probability of detection. But does such an optimal fine exist? We focus on emissions from production, and, even if we assume that the damage function is perfectly known, we still show that the optimal fine typically does not exist. Non-existence occurs as the environmental damage function is non-linear in overall emissions, meaning that there are interactions between emissions, the economy and the environment. We argue that these interactions cannot be accurately reflected in the fine imposed by the regulator. Previous literature on [...]
Publication year: 2010
Source: International Review of Law and Economics, In Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available online 20 August 2010
Emanuela, Carbonara , Piero, Pasotti
Minority-protection laws often differ over time and across societies. We show how the dynamic interaction between strong and weak social groups may account for these differences and their evolution. We assume that interaction occurs in a democratic environment, where representative institutions design norms according to the perceived voters’ support. Minority protection is strong when social reaction to discrimination is high. Interestingly, when discriminators harm members of weak social groups more if they do not react against discrimination, an initial increase in minority protection immediately reduces the level of social unrest, giving rise to fluctuations, as protest starts again when [...]
Publication year: 2010
Source: International Review of Law and Economics, In Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available online 14 August 2010
Ronen, Avraham , Álvaro, Bustos
This paper focuses on the economic and legal implications of the enactment of caps on noneconomic damages on conflicting parties who know that state supreme courts may strike down the caps as unconstitutional within a few years of enactment. We develop a simple screening model where parties have symmetric expectations regarding the probability of a strike down and asymmetric information regarding plaintiff‘s non-economic harm. Our model makes the following predictions: First, caps may increase the length required to resolve disputes if the caps are low enough or the probability of a strike down is large enough. Second, although caps [...]
Publication year: 2010
Source: International Review of Law and Economics, In Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available online 3 August 2010
Alberto Jose, [...]
Publication year: 2010
Source: International Review of Law and Economics, In Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available online 30 July 2010
Tim, Friehe
This paper studies the impact of varying defendant fault on the comparison of litigation outcomes under the contingent fee regime and the legal expenses insurance regime. The criteria for regime comparison are: (i) expected plaintiff payoffs, (ii) plaintiff and defendant expenditures, (iii) total contest effort, (iv) incentives for delegation, and (v) justice. We find that the performance of both regimes is highly dependent on defendant fault and this serves to sharpen the analysis to current [...]
Publication year: 2010
Source: International Review of Law and Economics, In Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available online 1 July 2010
Bharat, Bhole , Jeffrey, Wagner
Juries/courts sometimes award large punitive damages when the probability of detecting harm is high and take the recklessness of actions into account. However, economic theory suggests punitive damages should generally be low in such contexts. We argue that juries may be acting wisely. In particular, we show that: (a) even if the probability of conviction is one, punitive damages can raise welfare by aligning an injurer’s perceived and actual benefit of care; and (b) a recklessness requirement for awarding punitive damages can be welfare-enhancing when there is uncertainty about the court’s view of appropriate [...]
Publication year: 2010
Source: International Review of Law and Economics, Volume 30, Issue 2, June 2010, Page CO2
[No author name available] [...]
|
|
