Significant issues such as parallel mergers, minority shareholdings, and warehousing were debated vigorously—and will have to be clarified in the years ahead.

Flaws have appeared in the cooperation between the Commission and NCAs in relation to upward referrals to the Commission with no guarantee of improvement as a result of the soon to be adopted Guidelines on Best Practices for communication between these authorities.

The Commission is instead focusing on achieving the internal market for energy by regulatory means, by trying to ensure implementation of the third energy package and by facilitating the convergence of market rules in cooperation with ACER.

Perceived regulatory gaps in the regulation of wholesale energy trade have been addressed with a new transparency regulation, which is supposed to enhance regulatory oversight by imposing far-reaching reporting obligations on undertakings and prohibiting insider trading.

This raises issues as the two sets of rules are not necessarily identical and the authorities in charge of applying them do not always pursue the same objectives.

This article proposes criteria helping to distinguish cases in which competition law is likely to be a more or less useful complement to regulation.

As for cases in which competition law may, in principle, be useful, the authors argue for an intervention that accounts for the objectives set by regulation.

The Notice lays down a two-step method—basic amount adjusted on an individual and legal basis—and aims at granting a more foreseeable nature to penalties.

But its structured and sometimes stiff provisions generate a risk of soaring sanctions—hence the hope, in the French antitrust community, that they will be applied with some restraint by the competition authority.

In economics, the case raised questions dealt with under the ‘double-sided market’ theory.

Apparently, that theory was not used by the Commission—which, as a result, failed to benefit from its insights regarding firms dealing with distinct customer groups such as merchants and final consumers in the case at issue.

Discussions have been under way within the Brasilian legislature for ten years and there are signs that a new bill could emerge soon.

To prepare practitioners to the new coming law, this article analyses the main areas where changes would be introduced and the issues on which opinions remain divided.

From case law, it appears that the institution is vested with a broad power to reconsider its decisions where the lifting of the original decision would be to the benefit of the addressee.

By contrast, the European Courts have limited the instances in which the Commission would be under an obligation to do so.

Recent cases indicate that the Commission does not appear to go beyond these possibilities/requirements.

The main purpose of the reform is to add coherence to the Finnish competition rules after sev-eral partial amendments over the years, as well as to further harmonize the legislation with the EU laws.

The new substantive amendments include the harmonization of the concept of undertaking with the definition developed in the case law of the European Court of Justice as well as the introduction of the SIEC-test as the applicable intervention test for concentrations.

In addition, several procedural changes have been introduced in relation to e.g. investigatory powers of the authority, sanctions and the merger control process

To provide a more general perspective, this article analyses the role played by the ombudsman in competition law proceedings—including the 35 complaints dealt with by him so far in that context.

From that analysis, it appears that some recent EO decisions have been influential in improving deficiencies in competition proceedings; that EO findings can have an impact on judicial proceedings; and that, along with the Hearing Officer, the EO operates a control that could strengthen the Commission’s legitimacy in light of the general due process debate.

Although they were apparently restrictive in the use of Article 22 in the past, Member States tend to consider that possibility more often nowadays.

An analysis of practice demonstrates that referrals can have dramatic consequences on the outcome of cases.

The Commission appears to answer in the positive in the horizontal guidelines as it indicates that business decision sharing generally leads to cartels.

That strict approach has recently been applied, in Spain, in two important cases.

This appears from the ruling issued by the ECJ in AG2R Prévoyance regarding the de-monopolisation of public services performing economic activities.

A complementary approach is advocated by the Commission in a new Communication detailing the conditions under which financial assistance can be provided for the provision of services of general interest.

Although it is correct, that association does not reflect initiatives taken in the last months to improve the economy.

Among these changes, the modifications brought to the rules of competition should contribute to laying down foundations for a more open, modern and efficient economy

As regards foreign mergers, the control classically follows an economics-based approach centring on unilateral and coordinated effects which also extends to vertical and diagonal merges.

Besides typical factors such as market concentration, market entry, efficiency defence and failing company defence, MOFCOM again made it quite clear, that industrial policy is on the agenda.

The Commission has provided in-depth assessment of vertical mergers ranging from markets where vertical integration is a structural feature to others where the changing nature of operations makes predictions more difficult.

In a number of cases, the Commission has assessed efficiency gains alleged by parties—not as a separate element to be offset against potential anticompetitive effects but as part of an integrated analysis of the potential impact of the merger.

The guidelines drafted by the Commission have provided a reliable framework and have been complemented with increasingly sophisticated techniques allowing for a more economic approach to take shape in a way that appears accepted by the European courts.

The analysis encompasses such things as overcharge and passing-on, and the fee structures available in each jurisdiction whether conditional, contingent, etc.

The availability of collective actions and the chances of standalone actions are also examined.

The objective is reached, partly at least, in the Regulation, which provides more clarity on issues important in that regard.

But the Guidelines remain desperately vague – potentially causing a ‘chilling effect’ towards efficient practices and creating a risk that firms may unconsciously engage in unlawful activities.

The suspension of national recovery measures cannot validly justify the absence of recovery, unless the suspension is adopted in compliance with the conditions established by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.

This paper brings together several different strands of economic literature to provide an overview of economic theory and empirical evidence that can help us understand cartels.

The paper focuses on how sanctions affect incentives to participate in cartels, the stability of cartels, and the effects of cartels.

In doing so, they seem to have underestimated the negative effect that the perspective of private action may have on public enforcement.

Potential defendants fearing that actions for damages could be brought against them may abstain from or withhold confessions in the context of leniency programmes.

Do we need a one step approach (single procedure dealing with fines and damages) to solve the conflict?

The report highlights the general uniformity across the U.S. and European Union approaches to airline alliance competition issues and makes the case for further cooperation and coordination.

Furthering the goal of harmonization, however, will be enhanced by reconciling key differences in regulatory regime and analytical approaches, particularly in regard to grants of antitrust immunity.

Both airlines and regulators in the U.S. and European Union face the question of how entry by low cost carriers on transatlantic routes will change the alliance landscape.

Meanwhile, debates pertaining to distribution law have been intense before national courts. Among them we can find the classic issue of the justification of the implementation of an exclusive or quantitative selective distribution network. Some decisions are currently anxiously awaited; this is particularly the case in France regarding quantitative selective distribution networks. The national tendency of protecting distributors through contract law also needs to be monitored.

Today, they are the guardians of the rights of defence, and contribute to the objectivity, transparency and efficiency of EU competition proceedings.

In the current debate about due process, suggestions have been made to strengthen their role further.

The case ended with a “no grounds for action” decision

The theory of “predatory entry” is likely to survive for future cases, but should it?

These decisions remind antitrust practitioners that, in some countries, foreign investment may be submitted to scrutiny beyond traditional merger control.

This article analyses the situation in Canada, critically assessing the approach used by authorities in their review of foreign investment transactions.

Notwithstanding recent events, the article concludes that Canada remains open for business, with increasingly open policies and ongoing recognition of the importance of encouraging foreign investment.

Much of the focus of the guidance is on the so called ‘de minimis’ exception where the markets are not regarded as sufficiently important to justify making a reference and where the OFT has developed a very detailed assessment process;

The new guidance also updates and amends the OFT’s earlier guidance on the situations in which it will consider accepting undertakings in lieu to the CC (particularly in relation to approval of purchasers and up-front buyer obligations).

This article reviews the new guidance and its practical implications for parties.

These objections dwelt on the extent to which such broadcasters can use public funds to subsidise their internet activities that are carried out in competition with private actors.

In order to establish a clear test, inspiration can be drawn from practices in several Member States, particularly Germany.

Competition rules have been enforced mostly by ways of commitment decisions at European level while, at a national level, authorities investigated cases of market foreclosure, potential collusive behaviour and manipulations in wholesale markets.

On a substantive point, the Commission considers that long term and large scale capacity reservation can amount to an abuse irrespective of the needs of the dominant company. That view is problematic for operators and does not seem compatible with current competition law principles.