The Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 95-136, February 2010.
Abstract We investigate the evolution of the legal institution of citizenship from a political economy perspective. We first present a median‐voter model of the determination of citizenship laws. Next we test the implications of the model on a new set of data on citizenship laws across countries. We show that citizenship laws respond to economic and institutional determinants endogenously. When facing increasing immigration, countries with a jus soli regime tend to restrict their legislation, whereas countries with a jus sanguinis regime resist innovation. The welfare burden does not prove to be an obstacle to jus soli legislation, but demographic stagnation encourages it. A high degree of democracy promotes the adoption of jus soli elements, whereas instability of state borders determined by decolonization impedes it. Religion and ethnic diversity have no residual effect.
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